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GIDEON: LOOKING BACKWARD, LOOKING
FORWARD, LOOKING IN THE MIRROR
Steven Zeidman*
I. INTRODUCTION
People concerned about the rights of poor people who have been charged
with crime talk longingly and despairingly about “the promise of Gideon.”1
If you “google” that phrase you will find countless references dating back
to, well, Gideon.2 Various lawsuits, myriad commissions, and numerous law
review articles since time immemorial have detailed the crisis in indigent
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1
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942), and holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right
that applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and
guarantees indigent defendants the right to counsel in all felony cases).
2
See, e.g., Richard D. Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise
of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
625 (1986) [hereinafter The Emperor Gideon]; Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled: The
Need for Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062 (2000); Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (“[T]he promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has
a right to counsel at trial[.]”); STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content
/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_couns
BROKEN
el_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter
GIDEON’S
PROMISE]; Editorial, Gideon’s Promise, Still Unkept, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1993, at A22;
Anthony Lewis, The Silencing of Gideon’s Trumpet, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 20, 2003
(“endless failures to bring the promise of Gideon to life”).
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defense.3 In fact, reference to “the promise of Gideon” is usually
immediately preceded by reference to “the crisis in indigent defense.”4
The oft-chronicled “problem” and “crisis” of indigent defense is usually
cast as one of resources—either defense attorneys are not being provided at
3

See, e.g., Duncan v. State of Michigan, 791 N.W.2d 713 (Mich. 2010); Hurell-Harring
v. State of New York, 930 N.E.2d 217, 225–27 (2010); AM. BAR ASS’N., GIDEON
UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING 3 (1982), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/in
digentdefense/gideonundone.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter CRISIS IN INDIGENT
DEFENSE FUNDING]; COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 34 (2006) (“The crisis in
indigent representation in this state is a well documented fact. The time for action is
now.”), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/indigentdefense-commission/Indigent
DefenseCommission_report06.pdf.; STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, NATIONAL INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM: THE SOLUTION
IS MULTIFACETED (2012), available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wpcontent/files_flutter/135757 4231NIDR_ Solution.pdf [hereinafter ABA NAT’L INDIGENT
DEFENSE REFORM]; Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense
Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 427 (2009) (“For years, scholars
have documented the national crisis in indigent defense and its many tragic implications,
and yet the crisis persists.”); Paul Marcus & Mary Sue Backus, The Right to Counsel in
Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2006).
4
See, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 2, at 38 (“[I]ndigent defense in the
United States remains in a state of crisis . . . When we fail to deliver on the promise of
Gideon . . . the integrity of the criminal justice system is eroded and the legitimacy of
criminal convictions is called into question.”); Wayne A. Logan, Litigating the Ghost of
Gideon in Florida: Separation of Powers as a Tool to Achieve Indigent Defense Reform,
75 MO. L. REV. 885, 885 (2010) (“Today, the promise long ago heralded by Clarence
Gideon’s successful appeal goes unfulfilled, as public indigent defense systems
nationwide operate in perpetual crisis mode.”); Bill Piatt, Reinventing the Wheel:
Constructing Ethical Approaches to State Indigent Legal Defense Systems, 2 ST. MARY’S
J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 372, 374–75 (2012) (“Forty years later, Gideon’s potential
influence has been characterized as a broken promise. Attorney General Eric Holder
recently characterized our indigent-defense systems as a ‘crisis.’”); Richard Klein, The
Role of Defense Counsel in Ensuring a Fair Justice System, CHAMPION, June 2012, at 38,
43 (“The academic literature has taken note of this [indigent defense] crisis and is filled
with titles of articles such as Gideon’s Muted Trumpet, Gideon’s Promise Unfulfilled,
Gideon at 40: Facing the Crisis, Fulfilling the Promise, The Silence of Gideon’s
Trumpet, Keeping Gideon from Being Blown Away, and The Emperor Gideon Has No
Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel.”) (footnotes omitted).
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critical stages of the case, or they are so under-resourced that they are
unable to provide truly effective assistance.5 Whether viewed as actual or
constructive denials of the right to counsel, these critical issues are but
preliminary matters to analyze when confronting the failed promise of
Gideon. While it is of course necessary to demand that fully resourced
attorneys be made available for all who are accused of crime,6 that in and of
itself is not sufficient to fulfill the promise of Gideon.
In Gideon, Justice Black wrote that “any person haled into court, who is
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him.”7 It seems clear that Clarence Earl Gideon wanted an
attorney to represent him at trial.8 Indeed, after being forced to defend
himself at his first trial,9 and despite doing so “about as well as could be
5
See, e.g., CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING, supra note 3, at 3 (“The financing of
criminal defense services for indigents is generally inadequate[.]”); The Emperor Gideon,
supra note 2, at 627 (“[T]he severity of the underfunding of those agencies providing
defense counsel to the indigent seriously endangers the sixth amendment guarantee to
effective assistance of counsel.”); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise:
Lessons From England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 838
(2004) (“[T]here is abundant evidence that systems of indigent defense routinely fail to
assure fairness because of under-funding and other problems.”). In Strickland v.
Washington, the Court held that “‘the right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel.’” 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
6
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Court extended Gideon’s reach to all cases where the
accused faced the possibility of incarceration. 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
7
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (emphasis added).
8
Gideon wrote,

It makes no difference how old I am or what color I am or what church I
belong too if any. The question is I did not get a fair trial. The question is very
simple. I requested the court to appoint me attorney and the court refused. All
countrys try to give there Citizens a fair trial and see to it that they have
counsel.
Reply to Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gideon v. Cochran, No. 890 Misc.
(Oct. 1961), available at http://www.ct.gov/ocpd/cwp/view.asp?a=4087&q=479204.
9
See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 792. Twenty years before Gideon first stood trial, the
Supreme Court rejected an absolute constitutional guarantee of counsel for indigent
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expected from a layman,”10 Gideon was found guilty of breaking and
entering into a Florida pool hall and taking money from a cigarette vending
machine and juke box; he then was sentenced to five years in state prison.11
Subsequently, at his retrial, when he was finally represented by counsel, the
jury acquitted Gideon after one hour of deliberations.12
The truth, or irony, is that even as attorneys are being provided more and
more often, their representation usually consists of facilitating guilty pleas,
not litigating trials.13 Even the United States Supreme Court recently
acknowledged that the prevailing, dominant mode of criminal defense
representation is entering guilty pleas.14 The undeniable truth is that
defendants in noncapital cases. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462, 471–72 (1942)
(holding that due process required appointment of counsel in noncapital cases only where
circumstances of a particular case demonstrated that indigent defendant would otherwise
be denied fundamental fairness).
10
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 792–93.
11
See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 7, 244–45 (1964).
12
See id. at 249.
13
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 991 (1983) (“[O]ur
accusatorial ideals have been so perverted by plea bargaining that American officials
commonly expect . . . an unqualified affirmation of guilt.”); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating
the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L.
REV. 1117, 1138 (2011) [hereinafter Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market]
(“[T]oday, 95 percent of criminal convictions result from guilty pleas and only 5 percent
result from trials. Plea bargaining is no longer a negligible exception to the norm of trials;
it is the norm.”) (footnote omitted); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and
Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407, 409 (2008) (“Plea bargaining now dominates the
day-to-day operation of the American criminal justice system; about ninety-five percent
of convictions are obtained by way of a guilty plea.”) (footnote omitted).
14
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“[C]riminal justice today is for the
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399,
1407 (2012) (“The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the
administration of the criminal justice system that defense counsel have responsibilities in
the plea bargain process . . . that must be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel
that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical stages.”); see also
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (“[W]e have long recognized that the
negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.”).
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Gideon’s original request for a lawyer to be appointed to represent him at
trial has devolved into lawyers appointed to simply negotiate plea bargains.
This essay argues that the single-minded attention given to increasing
resources as the external cure for what ailed Clarence Earl Gideon obscures
a long overdue examination of what it is that public defenders actually do
on behalf of their clients. All too often, public defenders and advocates for
indigent defendants point fingers when asked about the indigent defense
crisis—the government will not pony up sufficient funds, the legislature
criminalizes too many things, the police department makes too many
quality-of-life and zero tolerance arrests, the prosecution too rarely declines
to prosecute, the judges seldom dismiss, etc.15 All of these accusations are
legitimate and contribute mightily to the “crisis.” Nevertheless, public
defenders must also look inward and ask how, if at all, they contribute to
Gideon’s failed promise and how they might change for the better. In 2010,
the Department of Justice convened a national symposium on indigent
defense entitled, “Looking Backward, Looking Forward,”16 harkening back
to a similar symposium held in 1999.17 It is now time for public defenders
to look in the mirror.

15

See, e.g., ABA NAT’L INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM, supra note 3, at 5 (“Overreliance
upon the criminal justice system as an instrument of social and regulatory control,
absence of administrative support structures, and insufficient funding streams have left
the assurance of Gideon fundamentally unfulfilled.”); THE SPANGENGBERG GRP.,
STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE KAYE’S
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 162 (2006), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefensecommission/SpangenbergGroupReport.p
df.
16
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE: LOOKING
BACK, LOOKING FORWARD, 2000–2010 (Feb. 18–19, 2010), available at http://www.nij
.gov/nij/topics/courts/indigent-defense/2010-symposium/national-symposium-2010program.pdf.
17
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, IMPROVING
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE
COLLABORATIONS (Feb. 25–26 1999), available at http://www.sado.org/fees/icjs.pdf.
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLEA BARGAINING AND DEFENSE
COUNSEL
Much has been written about the prevalence of guilty pleas in criminal
court.18 Consciously, as well as subconsciously, it behooves judges,
prosecutors, and, yes, defense counsel, to swiftly dispose of cases and
thereby maintain more manageable caseloads. Along the way, institutional
players develop a shared sense of what any given case is worth and operate
collaboratively according to their understanding of the going rate.19 Defense
attorneys also engage in their own version of triage by sorting out which
cases require more resources and relegating others to the trash heap of pleabargaining.20
18

See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
FISCAL YEAR 2011 3 (2012) (“The vast majority of convicted defendants plead guilty. In
fiscal year 2011, more than 96 percent of all offenders did so, a rate that has been largely
the same for ten years.”), available at http://www.fpd-ohn.org/sites/default/files/files/
2012October%20Overview%20of%20Federal%20Criminal%20Cases%20FY%202011.p
df; H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the
Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 78 (2011) (“[P]lea bargaining now accounts for
an overwhelming majority of case dispositions[.]”); O’Hear, supra note 13; Bibas,
Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 13; Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) (“[P]lea
bargaining is . . . not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system.”).
19
See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 158–59 (1979) (“This concept of the worth of a
case has considerable significance for criminal justice officials. By establishing the worth
of a case, both the prosecutor and defense attorney know how to treat it . . . . [W]hen
pressed to specify how they evaluate the ‘worth’ of a case, [prosecutors and defense
attorneys] claim to know it intuitively.”); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1117, 1146 (2008) (“Bargains are struck according to ‘going rates’—known
and somewhat fixed starting-point prices.”); O’Hear, supra note 13, at 415–17
(discussing the “impersonal, rapid-fire nature of . . . routine case processing,” in which
cases are resolved “by reference to shared understandings as to the ‘worth’ of various
generic case types”); Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 13, at
2481 (“[Defense attorneys] develop a feel for cases and can gauge the going rate for
particular types of crimes and defendants.”).
20
See, e.g., John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215,
1225 (1994) (arguing that public defender’s work in lower courts “is better described by
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While many have critiqued the reliance on pleas, and the lack of
adversarialness21 that characterize criminal courts, it is time to carefully
analyze the specific role defense counsel plays in the plea juggernaut.
Imagine that the ongoing cry for more resources was addressed, and public
defender offices were suddenly flush. What, if anything, would defense
lawyers actually do differently? While more resources would certainly
mean fewer clients per attorney, would that, in and of itself, mean Gideon’s
promise had been realized? Would it yield trial representation of the sort
that directly benefitted Gideon?
More than forty years ago, Jonathan Casper, in probably the first socalled “consumer perspective” study of indigent defense, asked the accused
what they thought of their lawyers.22 His findings—defendants felt like their

the medical/disaster theory of allocation in chaos—triage”); John B. Mitchell, In (Slightly
Uncomfortable) Defense of “Triage” by Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 925
(2005); People v. Jones, 186 Cal. App. 4th 216, 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance where he “prioritize[d]” his cases due to
excessive caseload of sole investigator made available to him by county and, in the
instant case, failed to promptly investigate availability of percipient witnesses, and by
not requesting permission to withdraw for lack of investigative resources) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
21
See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 13, at 932–34; Gerald E. Lynch, Our Administrative
System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2121 (1998).
But if plea bargaining grows out of an adversarial ideology, its widespread
practice has resulted in the development of a system of justice that actually
looks, to most defendants, far more like what American lawyers would call an
inquisitorial system than like the idealized model of adversary justice
described in the textbooks.
Id.; O’Hear, supra note 13, at 426 (“[I]n many jurisdictions, Gerald Lynch’s
characterization of plea bargaining [is] apt: administrative justice has replaced adversarial
and the prosecutor now occupies the primary role in adjudicating guilt and setting
punishments. In plea bargaining, then, the prosecutor may be perceived by
defendants . . . as the key decisionmaker.”).
22
JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT’S
PERSPECTIVE (1972).
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lawyers focused primarily, if not exclusively, on guilty pleas23—have been
replicated repeatedly over the past several decades.24 The plea mentality and
directive is deeply entrenched.25 Unless and until that institutional norm is
changed,26 you can add lawyers and reduce caseloads, but still not achieve
23

Id. at 106 (“Most of the men reported that among the first words uttered by their
public defender were: ‘I can get you [out] if you plead guilty.’”).
24
See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts et al., Public Defender’s Conundrum: Signaling
Professionalism and Quality in the Absence of Price, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 525, 528
(2002) (“[T]his Essay confirms, in line with previous research from other locales, that
criminal defendants . . . who are represented by privately retained lawyers are the most
satisfied with their legal representation. Conversely, defendants who are represented by
public defenders are the least satisfied.”); Alan F. Arcuri, Lawyers, Judges, and Plea
Bargaining: Some New Data on Inmates’ Views, 4 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY
177, 183 (1976) (defendants “reported that they were pressured into pleading guilty.”);
Edward J. Berger & Roger Handberg, Jr., Symbolic Justice: Disappointed Clients’ Views
of Their Attorneys, 2 CRIM. JUST. REV. 113, 115 (1977); Marcus T. Boccaccini et al.,
Development and Effects of Client Trust in Criminal Defense Attorneys: The Congruence
Model of Trust Development, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 197 (2004); Stewart O’Brien et al.,
The Criminal Lawyer: The Defendant’s Perspective, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283 (1977); Glen
Wilkerson, Public Defenders as Their Clients See Them, 1 AM. J. CRIM. L. 141, 143
(1972) (“Real or imagined pressure to plead guilty is a frequent complaint of defender
clients.”).
25
O’Hear, supra note 13, at 409 (“[D]espite the strenuous objections of prominent
academic commentators, plea bargaining seems to be growing only more entrenched over
time.”) (footnote omitted); Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea
Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 718 (2006)
(“Notwithstanding the continuing controversy about threshold questions of fairness and
legality, plea bargaining exists as a well-entrenched institution.”).
26
See generally MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978) (discussing the socialization
process by which defense attorneys and prosecutors adapt to the institutional norm of
plea bargaining); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2476 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas, Outside the Shadow] (“[P]lea
bargaining is a secret area of law, unlike trials, which have clear rules. In plea bargaining,
it is easier for inexperienced lawyers to fall afoul of unwritten norms by pushing too hard,
not hard enough, or not in the right way.”); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law
as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 15, 20–23 (1967) (describing how the organizational pressures of criminal courts
cause defense attorneys to abandon their duty of zealous advocacy and, in turn, become
bureaucratic “agent-mediators” who are focused on “strategies which tend to lead to a
plea”); George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857 (2000) (arguing
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“the promise of Gideon” as envisioned by Gideon himself—a lawyer to
represent the accused at trial.
It may well be the case that the original promise of Gideon, or at least the
original appeal by Gideon himself for a lawyer to represent him at trial, is
unattainable. Given the deep-rooted and intractable predominance of pleas,
perhaps the promise of Gideon should be re-imagined. Perhaps the
appropriate way to analyze the promise of Gideon is to ask if lawyers for
the accused are providing truly meaningful representation during the plea
bargaining process.

III. A GROWING AWARENESS OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL IN PLEA BARGAINING
A trilogy of recent cases undeniably reveals that criminal defense
counseling is on the Supreme Court’s radar.27 At the heart of Padilla,
Lafler, and Frye is the advice, or lack thereof, provided by a criminal
defense lawyer to a client.28 For years, when reviewing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, courts focused almost exclusively on trials
(not surprisingly, given Gideon itself); they examined the attorney’s
preparation for, and performance at, trial.29 More recently, courts have

that the rise of plea bargaining in modern American criminal procedure was driven by the
institutional interests of prosecutors and judges).
27
See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399
(2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
28
See infra Part B.
29
See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993) (“‘[T]he right to the effective
assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on
ability of the accused to receive a fair trial. Absent some effect of challenged conduct on
the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not
implicated.’”) (quoting United States v. Cronic 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)); Nix v.
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (“[T]he ‘benchmark’ of an ineffective assistance
claim is the fairness of the adversary proceeding[.]”) (quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684 (“[T]he Sixth Amendment right
to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.”)
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started to evaluate, from ethical and constitutional vantage points, the things
public defenders actually do day-to-day—advise about guilty pleas.30
Courts are expressing interest in the previously sacrosanct area of
lawyer/client conversations and are asking defense attorneys about the
nature and quality of their advice.31 Put another way, courts are now
examining what the defense attorney said to her client, and when she said it.
A. Boria v. Keane
One of the first cases to navigate these uncharted waters was Boria v.
Keane from the Second Circuit.32 Boria wrestled with the defense attorney’s
duty to advise; specifically, the lawyer’s responsibility to offer an informed
opinion on the wisdom of accepting or rejecting a plea.33
Oscar Boria was offered a plea with a sentence of one to three years in
prison.34 He rejected the plea, went to trial, was convicted, and was
sentenced to twenty years to life in prison.35 On appeal, he claimed
ineffective assistance of counsel based on his lawyer’s apparent neutrality;
that is, his attorney’s failure to offer an opinion as to whether Boria should
plead guilty or opt for a trial.36
In finding that counsel was ineffective, the Court relied on, and in effect
constitutionalized, certain ethical rules from the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the American Bar Association (ABA)
(emphasis added). See generally Steven Zeidman, To Plead or Not to Plead: Effective
Assistance and Client-Centered Counseling, 39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 844–47 (1998).
30
See, e.g., Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
31
See, e.g., Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482; Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384.
32
Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 1996).
33
Id. at 496 (“There seems to be no Second Circuit decision dealing with the precise
question of a criminal defense lawyer’s duty when a defendant’s best interests clearly
require that a proffered plea bargain be accepted, but the defendant, professing
innocence, refuses to consider the matter.”).
34
Id. at 494–95.
35
Id. at 495.
36
See id.
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Standards on Criminal Justice.37 This holding was remarkable because
while it was always apparent that the ethical rules were protective of
defendants’ rights, appellate courts tended to dismiss them as “merely”
aspirational and lacking constitutional heft.38 Now appellate courts, right up
to the Supreme Court, are engaging in careful review of these aspirational
standards and imbuing them with constitutional gravitas, making them part
of the required components of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the
effective assistance of counsel.39
While all lawyers should, of course, be familiar with their ethical
obligations, particularly those most germane to their practice, defense
lawyers now have additional motivation to brush up on the rules of
professional responsibility. It is more likely than ever before that, at some
point in her career, a public defender will be called to testify in a postconviction proceeding about her counseling and her familiarity with the
relevant ethical standards.40 Also, defense attorneys can better serve their
clients by relying on these and other not-yet-constitutionalized ethical rules
37

Id. (“The American Bar Association’s standard on the precise question before us is
simply stated in its Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 7-7
(1992): ‘A defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his client on whether
a particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable.’”).
38
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Prevailing norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, e.g., ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they
are only guides.”); U.S. v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[The ABA
Standards] constitute a ‘blend of description of function, functional guidelines, ethical
guidelines, and recommended techniques,’ a mixture of the aspirational and the
obligatory.”); Kizer v. Davis, 369 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (“[T]he Ethical
Considerations are ‘aspirational’ goals only.”).
39
See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (“The weight of
prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client
regarding the risk of deportation.”) (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.1(a) (3d ed. 1993) and ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3.2(f) (3d ed. 1999)).
40
See, e.g., Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 1996) (involving a defense attorney
called to testify at hearing on defendant’s motion to vacate conviction).
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in the face of judges urging them to move faster or handle more cases.41
Ultimately, the court’s interest in counseling should serve as a trigger for
defense attorneys to think even harder about counseling and advice
giving—in other words, about what it means to be a lawyer for poor people
accused of crime.
41

For example, many public defenders carry staggering caseloads. See, e.g., GIDEON’S
BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 2, at 17–18. Perhaps now those attorneys will be able to
cite ethical rules and guidelines to prevent judges from ordering them to take on more
clients. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004) (requiring that “competent
representation” be provided, consisting of “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 2 (2004) (“A lawyer’s work load must be controlled so that each
matter can be handled competently.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC
DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS 4 (2009) (declaring, in “Guideline 1,”
that public defense providers should “avoid[] excessive lawyer workloads and the
adverse impact that such workloads have on providing quality legal representation to all
clients”), available at http://www.defensenet.org/ABA%20Eight%20Guidelines%2
0of%20Public%20Defense%20Related%20to%20Excessive%20Workloads.pdf; ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006) (“If a lawyer’s
workload is such that the lawyer is unable to provide competent and diligent
representation to existing or potential clients, the lawyer should not accept new clients.”).
See generally NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS (2011),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/books/ls _sclaid
_def_securing_reasonable_caseloads.authcheckdam.pdf. A recent ruling by the Missouri
Supreme Court illustrates the growing relevance of ethical duties in the context of Sixth
Amendment ineffective assistance claims. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n
v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 607–08 (Mo. 2012) (holding that a judge may not appoint
counsel when the judge is aware that, for whatever reason, counsel is unable to provide
effective representation). In Waters, the Missouri High Court ruled that a trial judge
exceeded his authority by forcing the state public defender’s office to represent a
defendant in contravention of an agency rule permitting the state defender office to
decline additional appointments when the office’s excessive caseload prevented it from
providing competent and effective representation to any additional defendants. Id. at 612.
The court held and reaffirmed that “the Sixth Amendment and [the state] Court’s ethics
rules require that a court consider the issue of counsel’s competency, and that counsel
consider whether accepting an appointment will cause counsel to violate the Sixth
Amendment and ethical rules, before determining whether to accept or challenge an
appointment.” Id. at 609. In so holding, the court explained that counsel violates the
“ethical duty to provide effective assistance of counsel” when “she accepts a case that
results in a caseload so high it impairs her ability to provide competent representation, to
act with reasonable diligence, and to keep the client reasonably informed.” Id. at 607.
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B. Padilla v. Kentucky, Lafler v. Cooper, and Missouri v. Frye
The Supreme Court’s interest in the substance of defense lawyer
counseling is evident in Padilla v. Kentucky,42 Lafler v. Cooper,43 and
Missouri v. Frye.44 On their face, the holdings in these cases are far from
earth-shattering. Each case required the Court to look deep into the
attorney’s counseling. Notably, the Court’s analyses were not based on
reviews of trial transcripts, but rather on examinations of the lawyers’
testimony at post-conviction proceedings concerning their conversations
with their clients.
1. Padilla v. Kentucky
In Padilla,45 the Court held, essentially, that defense counsel must
provide her clients with adequate immigration-impact advice regarding a
given plea offer.46 As a result, many public defender offices now have
immigration specialists on staff, twenty-four hour immigration hotlines are
appearing, immigration manuals are proliferating, and Padilla-inspired
trainings are everywhere.47 It certainly appears that the defense bar is
responding in a literal way to Padilla.
Padilla’s most important potential effect lies not in its specific holding
that defense lawyers must provide adequate immigration advice, or even in
the oft-expressed hope that courts will expand Padilla’s logic and require

42

130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
44
132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
45
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1473.
46
See id. at 1486. (“To satisfy . . . [the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel], we now hold that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk
of deportation.”).
47
See, e.g., Malia Brink, A Gauntlet Thrown: The Transformative Potential of Padilla v.
Kentucky, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 39, 61–62 (2011); Steven Zeidman, Padilla v.
Kentucky: Sound and Fury, or Transformative Impact, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 203, 203–
04 (2012).
43
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defense attorneys to provide adequate advice on a range of consequences
that attach to a guilty plea (e.g., sex offender registration, eligibility for
loans and licenses, etc.).48 Rather, Padilla’s greatest potential impact lies in
how it can, should, and must change longstanding bad habits of providing
less than fully effective counseling.
For starters, consider the time-honored practice known derisively as
“meet ’em, greet ’em, and plead ’em”—the defense lawyers’ practice of
entering guilty pleas on their clients’ behalf after having “met” their clients
only twenty minutes earlier, for all of ten minutes.49 “Meet and plead” was

48
See, e.g., Margaret Love & Gabriel J. Chin, The “Major Upheaval” of Padilla v.
Kentucky: Extending the Right to Counsel to the Collateral Consequences of Conviction,
25 CRIM. JUST. 36, 41–42 (2010) (“[I]t seems likely that . . . efforts will be made to
expand the category of indirect consequences requiring a ‘Padilla advisory’ . . . . Sex
offender registration and residency requirements come to mind.”); id. at 41 (“Justice
Stevens’ opinion specifically left open the possibility that its holding might extend to
other indirect consequences of a plea[.]”); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter:
Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277,
321 (2012) (“As the nascent post-Padilla misdemeanor jurisprudence develops, it will
send a message to defenders that warnings about deportation, and possibly other severe
collateral consequences, are not only mandated in all levels of cases, but that the failure
to warn is most likely going to prejudice the misdemeanor client.”); McGregor Smyth,
From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its
Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795, 809 (2011) (“Even a cursory
reading of Padilla begs an inquiry into its application to other so-called ‘collateral
consequences’[.]”).
49
See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer
Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154,
205 n.156 (2012) (“[C]ommentators have noted a tendency . . . for underresourced
defense to plead too many cases—a phenomenon deemed ‘meet ’em, greet ’em, and
plead ’em.’”) (quoting Deborah L. Rhodes, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1785, 1793 (2001)); Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging AppointedCounsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 975 (2012) (“To
manage their crushing workloads, defense lawyers very often ’meet ’em and plead ’em,’
pressing their clients to plead guilty immediately before doing any investigation.”); Erica
J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461,
473–74 (2007) (“In many jurisdictions, a practice known as ‘meet ’em and plead ’em’
has become commonplace.”).
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always an apparent ethical violation.50 Now, it seems that “meet and plead”
is a de facto violation of Padilla and, accordingly, a constitutional violation
of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Padilla constitutionalized aspects of defense lawyering that had
previously been relegated to ethical/aspirational standards, so-called “best
practices.”51 Notably, the Court did not carve out a special rule or
exemption saying that this constitutional requirement of adequate advice is
inapplicable if the lawyer practices in a high-volume criminal court, if the
charges are comparatively minor, or if the moment in time is at the
accused’s initial arraignment or appearance before a judge.52
In light of Padilla, can a defense attorney provide constitutionally
adequate immigration advice after only just having met her client? At that
moment in time, can a lawyer actually know the immigration consequences
of a plea offer, and can she actually know her client’s immigration status?
After all, in many cases the accused is unaware, uncertain, or even wrong
about his present immigration situation. As the Court noted in Padilla,
immigration law is fluid, complex, and constantly changing.53 Surely, it is
risky and foolhardy for defense counsel to assume up-to-date knowledge of
immigration law at any given moment, and defense counsel should demand
time to speak with experts, research the law, and take whatever steps are
necessary to ensure full awareness of the consequences of any plea. Given
50

See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3.2 (1993)
[hereinafter PLEAS OF GUILTY] (“Defense counsel should not recommend to a defendant
acceptance of a plea unless appropriate investigation and study of the case has been
completed.”); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-6.1 (1993)
(“Under no circumstances should defense counsel recommend to a defendant acceptance
of a plea unless appropriate investigation and study of the case has been completed[.]”).
51
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (citing, inter alia, PLEAS OF
GUILTY § 14-3.2(f) and ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-5.1(a)).
52
See id. at 1486 (holding, without qualification, that “counsel must inform her client
whether his plea carries a risk of deportation”).
53
Id. at 1483 (“Immigration law can be complex, and it is a legal specialty of its own.”).
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the Court’s explicit reference to, and reliance on, ethical standards at the
root of its holding in Padilla, it is worth noting that recent ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice call for more careful, time-consuming consideration of
plea offers.54 ABA Standard 14-1.3(a) provides that “[a] defendant with
counsel should not be required to enter a plea if counsel makes a reasonable
request for additional time to represent the client’s best interests.”55 PostPadilla, it seems that every request for additional time made at the
accused’s arraignment56 is presumptively “reasonable,” if not mandatory.57
Further, defense counsel can seldom, if ever, be sure that she has an
accurate picture of her client’s immigration situation after just having met
the client. Virtually every text and article written about the initial interview
in criminal cases, especially interviews involving a free, governmentappointed attorney, highlights the inherent distrust between client and

54

PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3.2(f) (“To the extent possible, defense counsel should
determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to
the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the contemplated
plea.”).
55
Id. § 14-1.3(a).
56
For constitutional purposes, the term arraignment “refers to the defendant’s initial
appearance before a judicial officer, the point at which the magistrate informs the
defendant of the charges against him and sets the terms of pretrial release,” and at which
the accused is guaranteed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET
AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.3(a) (3d. ed. 2012); see also Rothgery v. Gillespie
Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008) (“We have, for purposes of the right to counsel, pegged
commencement to the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.”)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57
In New York City, for instance, almost 70 percent of misdemeanor cases get disposed
of at the initial appearance, mostly through a guilty plea. See, e.g., ROBERT C.
BORUCHOWITZ, ET AL., NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, MINOR
CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
COURTS 8 (2009); CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF N.Y., ANNUAL REPORT 2011 29
(2012) (“Citywide, slightly less than half of all case filings were disposed of at their
initial court appearance.”) (emphasis added), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/courts
/nyc/criminal/AnnualReport2011.pdf.

THIRD ANNUAL PUBLIC DEFENSE CONFERENCE

Gideon

lawyer.58 It takes time before someone charged with a crime, who is already
in a traumatic situation, will divulge sensitive and potentially harmful
information. Trust must be earned and developed over time; it cannot
happen in the typical ten or fifteen-minute arraignment interview.59
Some have suggested the use of a “checklist” as a best-practices response
to Padilla.60 In other words, at every initial interview, whether there is
58

See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, AM. LAW INST. & AM. BAR ASSOC., TRIAL
MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 108 (1988) (“As far as the client is
concerned, the lawyer is ‘the law,’ along with the police and the judge; the client has no
reason to believe that the lawyer is on the client’s side. S/he will distrust the lawyer even
more if the client is indigent and the lawyer is court-appointed.”); The Emperor Gideon,
supra note 2, at 667 (“The indigent defendant may view his defender at first with
suspicion since the same source of funds that is paying the police to arrest him and the
prosecutor to prosecute him . . . is also paying for his counsel.”); Bibas, Outside the
Shadow, supra note 26, at 2478 (“[C]lients still believe the adage that you get what you
pay for. Defendants trust appointed counsel less[.]”); Abbe Smith, The Difference in
Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 83, 119 (2003)
(“Once a lawyer has undertaken to represent an accused, it is often difficult to establish a
relationship of trust and confidence.”).
59
See, e.g., The Emperor Gideon, supra note 2, at 667 (“The defender needs to win over
the trust and confidence of the defendant, but the hurried attorney anxiously wishing to
conclude the interview so that he can go to the next court and see other defendants[] is
not likely to invite and encourage his client’s trust.”); O’Hear, supra note 13, at 447–48
(“[C]ase volumes and economic constraints often leave defense counsel with no more
than a few minutes to interact with many of their clients before court appearances—
nowhere near enough time to establish a relationship of trust with the client[.]”);
AMSTERDAM, supra note 58, at 108 (“Counsel will seldom find that it is possible to
overcome [a client’s distrust] . . . merely by promising the client that counsel intends to
work assiduously in the client’s behalf; rather, counsel must actually do something for the
client.”); see also id. at 105 (“The lawyer’s primary objective in the initial
interview . . . is the establishment of an attorney-client relationship grounded on mutual
confidence, trust, and respect.”).
60
E.g., Brink, supra note 47, at 62 (“Further steps need to be taken to extend Padilla to
other collateral consequences. Steps . . . include the development of charts and databases
of collateral consequences, including summaries of their applicability, as well as trainings
and checklists.”) (citing Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and
Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 690 (2011) (listing checklist
of questions an attorney should ask a client to determine potential collateral
consequences); Smyth, supra note 48, at 835 (“From building client relationships to
developing checklists, [a forthcoming article] will use the lessons and leverage of Padilla
as a part of a robust vision of holistic defense practice.”).
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seemingly any reason to question the accused’s citizenship, counsel should
ask and record the response in a checklist.61 While it may well be advisable
to ask in every case, merely asking does not mean that the lawyer will get
accurate information. In any event, what if the client equivocates or doesn’t
seem certain? Actually, what if the client does seem sure of his immigration
status? Should defense counsel stop there and check the box on the form, or
should counsel engage in a searching inquiry to satisfy concerns about
his/her client’s situation?62 Moreover, were counsel to try to so ascertain,
could he/she do it at the typical hurried and pressure-filled initial interview,
having just met his/her client for the first time? While checklists may be
useful, they do not mitigate the pernicious effects of “meet, greet, and
plead,” and are at best a de minimus response to Padilla.63
Many rightfully and fervently hope that Padilla’s call for adequate
immigration advice will soon be extended by courts to a host of other
potential consequences of a guilty plea.64 If that dream does come true, it
will make arraignment pleas that much more unconstitutional—a lawyer
could not possibly stay completely informed about such an extensive and
burgeoning body of law. In any case, defense attorneys need not wait for
courts to extend Padilla. Instead, criminal defense lawyers should
incorporate Padilla’s underlying rationale into their representation in
concrete ways, such as by eschewing any pleas until they are in a position to

61

See Chin, supra note 60, at 690.
See People v. McLartey, 32 Misc. 3d 1201(A), 2011 WL 2518628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June
22, 2011). In People v. McLartey, the court held that Padilla “does not require an
attorney to counsel a client professing to be a citizen of immigration consequences” of
taking a plea. Id. at *3.
63
In fact, the one thing a checklist does very well is insulate a conviction from postconviction claims that counsel failed to discuss immigration consequences with her
client. While that is certainly of great value to the prosecution and the judge, it is of
dubious value to the accused.
64
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
62
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give constitutionally adequate advice on a range of issues confronting their
clients.65
The assembly-line nature of criminal courts was decried decades ago by
Justice Harlan in Argersinger v. Hamlin,66 “[T]here is evidence of the
prejudice which results to misdemeanor defendants from this ‘assembly line
justice.’”67 Guilty pleas entered at the accused’s arraignment, or initial
appearance before a judge, are the single greatest and ongoing manifestation
of mechanized justice. Padilla presents an opportunity, if not a necessity,
for defense lawyers to get off the assembly line.
It may now be the case that defense attorneys have the Supreme Court’s
imprimatur to bolster their efforts to provide truly effective assistance
during the plea bargaining stage. The recent cases of Lafler v. Cooper68 and
Missouri v. Frye69 further present unique and overdue opportunities for
change. While Padilla dictates that defense attorneys think carefully about
65

See Smith v. Bank of America, 865 F. Supp. 2d 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). This recent
federal case highlights the extent of consequences that flow from an arrest, let alone a
conviction, and the need for defense attorneys to be sure they are prepared to help their
clients assess the wisdom of accepting or rejecting a proffered disposition. See id. In
Smith v. Bank of America, Jennifer Smith, a temporary bank employee was encouraged
by her employer to apply for full-time employment. Id. at 301. She did so, and informed
her supervisor that she had previously been arrested and charged with petty larceny and
that the charges had been dismissed pursuant to an Adjournment in Contemplation of
Dismissal (ACD). Id.; N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 170.55 (2012). Ms. Smith was offered
the job, but then received a letter from the bank saying she was ineligible for employment
because of “information regarding her criminal history obtained from a [FBI] background
check.” Smith, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 301. That background check revealed that she had been
arrested and charged with petty larceny and that she had received an ACD. Id. The Court
found that Ms. Smith had properly been denied the job based on federal laws that restrict
the ability of banks to hire people who have been accused or convicted of certain crimes,
including petty larceny. Id. at 306. The case should serve as a cautionary tale for all
defense attorneys that even dispositions without an admission of guilt can have disastrous
affects, and counsel must be sure they have taken the time to uncover all potential
ramifications of any disposition, even those that do not require a guilty plea.
66
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
67
Id. at 36.
68
132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
69
132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).

VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 3 • 2013

951

952 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

how they advise their clients concerning the immigration impact of a plea,
Lafler and Frye present a broader mandate—defense attorneys must think
harder about how they advise their clients about plea offers in general.
2. Lafler v. Cooper
For starters, in Lafler, the Court succinctly acknowledged “[c]riminal
justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”70
While most people familiar with the criminal court were already aware of
that reality, it is significant for the Court to make such a pronouncement
from its bully pulpit. Lafler and Frye are cases filled with practical
considerations that flow from the recognition that pleas rule the day.
Lafler71 and Frye72 relied on statistics regarding the prevalence of pleabargaining, and the dissent in both cases emphasized that the decisions
would open the floodgates to more guilty plea-related litigation.73
In Lafler, the accused was charged with assault with intent to murder and
with other offenses.74 The prosecution alleged that the defendant pointed a
gun at the victim’s head, fired and missed, and then chased her down the
street, firing repeatedly and shooting her in the hip, abdomen, and rear
end.75 The prosecution offered a plea with a sentence of fifty-one to eightyfive months in prison.76 Although the defendant had already expressed a
70

Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.
Id. (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state
convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”).
72
See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (citing DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl 5.22.2009).
73
See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinions deal with
only two aspects of counsel’s plea-bargaining inadequacy, and leave other aspects (who
knows what they might be?) to be worked out in further constitutional litigation that will
burden the criminal process.”); Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A]fter
today’s opinions there will be cases galore . . . that will emerge, many years hence, from
our newly created constitutional field of plea-bargaining law.”).
74
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383 (majority opinion).
75
Id.
76
Id.
71
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willingness to plead, he was dissuaded from doing because of his attorney’s
erroneous counseling; his attorney had the mistaken belief that the
prosecution would not, as a matter of law, be able to establish the requisite
intent to murder because the victim had been shot below the waist.77 As a
result of this counseling, the defendant rejected the plea offer and went to
trial.78 He was convicted and sentenced to 185 to 360 months.79
The Supreme Court held that the constitutional guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel requires that the lawyer provide accurate legal
advice.80 This part of the holding hardly seems extraordinary.81 Put simply,
77

See id.
See id.
79
Id.
80
See id. at 1385 (“The constitutional guarantee [of effective assistance of counsel]
applies to pretrial critical stages that are part of the whole course of a criminal
proceeding, a proceeding in which defendants cannot be presumed to make critical
decisions without counsel’s advice.”); id. at 1384 (“During plea negotiations defendants
are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel . . . . In the context of pleas a
defendant [claiming ineffective assistance of counsel] must show the outcome of the plea
process would have been different with competent advice.”) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010)
(“The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never
been more important.”).
81
Lafler is notable, though, for the Court’s application of the prejudice prong of the
Strickland analysis to the unique facts before it, and for the remedy that it fashioned. See
generally Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385. Unlike most Sixth Amendment claims previously
heard by the Court, Lafler involved ineffective assistance that “led not to an offer’s
acceptance but to its rejection,” and, in turn, to a trial resulting in a conviction. Id. The
government argued that an accused who rejects a plea offer and later receives a fair trial
was foreclosed from getting relief. See id. at 1385–88. The Court, however, explained
that the Sixth Amendment “requires effective assistance of counsel at critical stages of a
criminal proceeding,” and stated that it “is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of
a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.” Id. at 1388
(quoting Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012)). Indeed, “[f]ar from curing the
error [i.e., the incorrect legal advice that caused Mr. Cooper to reject the plea], the trial
caused the injury from the error.” Id. at 1386. Thus, the Court held that where deficient
advice leads to the rejection of an offer,
78

[A] defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is
a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the
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how could a lawyer have provided effective assistance if the advice she
gave was inaccurate? The Court’s holding, on its face, actually has little
bearing on indigent defense practice. It is hardly a leap of faith to assume
that every lawyer for poor people accused of crimes was already aware that
the legal advice he/she provides to an indigent client should be accurate.
However, there is more to the Court’s opinion than its ruling that there
had been ineffective assistance of counsel. It was actually Justice Scalia, in
his dissent, who flagged the unanswered questions of the majority’s
decision.82 First, after noting that ineffective assistance claims now apply to
plea bargaining, he cited to the following language from the majority
opinion in Frye: “The inquiry then becomes how to define the duty and
responsibilities of defense counsel in the plea bargain process. This is a
difficult question.”83 Scalia further wrote, “[t]oday’s opinions deal with
only two aspects of counsel’s plea-bargaining inadequacy,84 and leave other
aspects [who knows what they might be?] to be worked out in further
constitutional litigation.”85 Justice Scalia highlights the right questions:

court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution
would not have withdrawn it . . . ), that the court would have accepted its
terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms
would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact
were imposed.
Id. at 1385. On the record before it, the Court concluded that an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim had been established. Id. at 1386. The remedy, then, was for the
government to “reoffer the plea agreement.” Id. at 1391. Assuming the defendant accepts
the offer, the trial court would then have the discretion to accept or reject the plea. Id.
82
In an apparent effort to fully air his displeasure with the majority, Justice Scalia took
the extraordinary step of reading his dissents in Lafler and Frye from the bench. See
Adam Liptak, Justices’ Ruling Expands Rights of Accused in Plea Bargains, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 2012, at A1.
83
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408
(2012)).
84
The two aspects being that attorneys must know basic law (Lafler) and must convey to
the accused all plea offers advanced by the prosecution (Frye).
85
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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How will the duties and responsibilities of defense counsel in the plea
process be defined? And what might be other types of plea-bargaining
inadequacy? Defense lawyers serving indigent clients must seize the
moment and begin to frame and answer those vital questions.
Justice Scalia, by referring to the “whole new boutique of constitutional
jurisprudence [“plea-bargaining law”],”86 signals the potential reach of
Lafler. He criticizes the majority for opening up a Pandora’s Box of plea
bargaining litigation and for the speculative nature of its tests, or lack
thereof, for what constitutes effective assistance in plea bargaining.87 He,
along with Justice Alito,88 warns that the failure to define the parameters of
effective assistance in plea-bargaining will lead to years of litigation.89
3. Missouri v. Frye
In Frye, the accused was charged with driving with a revoked license.90
Due to prior convictions for the same offense, the new charges were raised
to the felony level, and the defendant faced four years in prison.91 The
prosecution offered a misdemeanor plea with a recommended ninety-day
jail sentence.92 The defense attorney failed to relay this offer to his client,
and after a series of intervening events (e.g., a rearrest), the defendant
eventually was sentenced to four years in prison.93
As with Lafler, the Court’s literal holding is far from novel and will
likely have very little impact on criminal defense attorneys.94 One has to
86

Id. at 1398.
See id. at 1392.
88
Id. at 1398 (Alito, J., dissenting).
89
See id. at 1392 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
90
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 1404–05.
94
Like its companion case, Frye is notable for the Court’s application of the Strickland
prejudice prong in the context of ineffective assistance claims relating to plea offers. Id.
at 1410–11. In Frye, defense counsel’s deficient performance—not communicating the
87
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assume that most defense lawyers were already well aware that they should
tell their clients of plea offers proposed by the prosecution, especially when
the offers include reducing a felony charge to a misdemeanor plea.
Once again, the Court’s decision is more significant for the possibilities it
suggests. Here is where the majority pens the words quoted by Justice
Scalia in his dissent in Lafler: “The inquiry then becomes how to define the
duty and responsibilities of defense counsel in the plea bargain process.
This is a difficult question.”95 Yet, even as the Court explicitly recognizes
the difficulty of that inquiry, it chooses to leave answers to that “difficult
question” for another day, stating, “[t]his case presents neither the necessity
nor the occasion to define the duties of defense counsel in these respects,
however.”96
Nevertheless, the Court does send a signal, or a hint, about where to look
for answers to the “question” when it notes that the ABA standards, along
with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, are “important guides.”97 In

plea offer—caused the offer to lapse. See id. at 1404. The question, under Strickland,
then “bec[ame] what, if any, prejudice resulted from the breach of duty.” Id. at 1409. The
Court held that:
To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel where a plea offer
has lapsed or been rejected [as was the case in Lafler] because of counsel’s
deficient performance, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability
they would have accepted the earlier offer had they been afforded effective
assistance of counsel. Defendants must also demonstrate a reasonable
probability the plea would have been entered without the prosecution
canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it, if they had the authority to
exercise that discretion under state law.
Id. The Court thus remanded the case for the Missouri Court of Appeals to determine
whether the plea offer would have been adhered to by the prosecution and accepted by
the trial court. Id. at 1411.
95
Id. at 1408.
96
Id.
97
Id.
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fact, the Court effectively constitutionalized certain ABA standards.98 That
result leads naturally to questions about the potential constitutional
implications of other related standards, and the ways they could answer the
“difficult question.” For example, harkening back to the blight of “meet
’em, greet ’em, and plead ’em,” defense lawyers must reconsider the value
of Standard 4-6.1: “Under no circumstances should defense counsel
recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate
investigation and study of the case has been completed, including an
analysis of controlling law and the evidence likely to be introduced.”99
Lawyers for poor people accused of crime must take Justice Kennedy’s
advice by looking to the ABA standards as “important guides” for counsel’s
obligations in plea-bargaining,100 and aim to see more aspirational standards
become imbued with constitutional significance.
Taken literally, the sum total of Padilla, Lafler, and Frye is that defense
lawyers must: (1) provide adequate immigration impact advice; (2) attain
and convey knowledge of the basic law involved in the particular case; and
(3) communicate plea offers to their clients.101 This is not momentous. The
potential those cases present, however, is for defense lawyers to recognize
the ways the court is now considering ethical standards and making them
part and parcel of the requirements of effective assistance of counsel, and to

98
See id. (“The American Bar Association recommends defense counsel ‘promptly
communicate and explain to the defendant all plea offers made by the prosecuting
attorney[.]’”) (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY §
14-3.2(a) (3d ed. 1999)).
99
ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-6.1 (1993).
100
See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
101
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (holding that defense counsel
must inform client whether plea carries risk of deportation); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct.
1376, 1383–88 (2012) (holding, in part, that Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel protects client against deficient advice during plea negotiations);
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (holding that defense counsel must communicate formal plea
offers to client).
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answer the large and practical question of what constitutes ethical and
constitutional advice regarding whether to accept or reject a plea.

IV. REFINING, EXPANDING, AND DEFINING EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
IN PLEA BARGAINING
Defense lawyers, in addition to answering the question about the
parameters of effective assistance in the plea bargaining context, should
look to see what kinds of issues and litigation were imagined by Justice
Scalia when he opined that the majority decisions in Lafler and Frye would
yield endless lawsuits about the quality of defense lawyering.102 Even in
Padilla, Justice Scalia referred to the “innumerable evidentiary hearings to
determine whether misadvice really occurred or whether the warning
[regarding deportation] was really given.”103 More specifically, with regard
to Lafler and Frye, he observed that the majority left much to be “worked
out” in further litigation, “which you can be sure there will be plenty of.”104
Justice Scalia’s prediction of further litigation is on the mark. While
Padilla, Lafler, and Frye require defense counsel to provide adequate
advice, they say practically nothing about the dimensions and context of
this critically important, sensitive, and constitutionally required function.
Lawyers defending indigent clients must now think critically about the
what, where, how, and when of the vital and essential task of counseling.
One area of inquiry that grows organically from the court’s foray into
plea-bargaining and advice-giving is the nature and quality of the advice;
moving beyond the checklist to assess quality.105 As Justice Kennedy said in
102

See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391–92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104
Liptak, supra note 82.
105
Two cases serve to illustrate the types of claims now becoming prevalent wherein the
defendant claims ineffective assistance based on the advice he received regarding
accepting a plea or opting for a trial. In U.S. v. Pitcher, the court analyzed defense
counsel’s advice and what the District Court termed his “unreasonably optimistic
assessment” of trial prospects. U.S. v. Pitcher, 559 F.3d 120, 121 (2d Cir. 2009).
103
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Lafler, “If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to
effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept it.”106 What
does that entail? How does the lawyer counsel the client, ethically and
constitutionally, about whether to accept a plea offer?107 It must mean more
than just conveying an offer and an accurate statement of the law. Is it
constitutionally sufficient for the defense lawyer to merely convey
immigration impact advice or the details of a plea offer and leave it at that?
Would there have been effective assistance in Padilla if defense counsel
had simply said, “by the way, this plea will get you deported?” Is there any
constitutional obligation to try to persuade, or to have engaged in some
minimal amount of factual and/or legal investigation before giving advice?
If post-Padilla, Lafler, and Frye defense lawyers regularly do provide the
Although the Circuit Court found for the prosecution, the counseling issue was front and
center. See id. at 125 (“Although we reverse on the grounds stated, we add that we are
wary of endorsing any precedent . . . that might suggest a duty on the part of defense
counsel to arm-twist a client who maintains his innocence into pleading guilty.”). In
Manley v. Belleque, the inquiry centered around the adequacy of defense counsel’s advice
that resulted in his client pleading guilty. Manley v. Belleque, 366 Fed. Appx. 734, 736
(9th Cir. 2010). The takeaway from these and similar recent cases is that the defense
lawyer’s counseling is no longer insulated from review.
106
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387.
107
In addition to thinking about how to counsel effectively, defense attorneys should
think about which subject matters must be part of the plea discussion. See, e.g., Ebron v.
Comm’r of Corr., 307 Conn. 342, 358–59 (Conn. 2012) (finding that defense attorney
was ineffective for failing to advise accused about risk of rejecting plea offer and having
his “egregious criminal record” surface later in presentence report during open plea);
Commonwealth v. Pridham, No. 2011-SC-000126-DG, 2012 WL 5274654, at *9 (Ky.
Oct. 25, 2012) (holding an ineffective assistance claim was sufficiently alleged where
defense attorney misadvised client that his guilty plea would render him eligible for
parole after six years of his thirty-year sentence, when in fact client’s period of parole
ineligibility extended to twenty years under state violent offender statute). But see
Commonwealth v. Abraham, 58 A.3d 42 (Pa. 2012) (holding trial counsel not ineffective
for failing to advise client that he would lose public employee pension if he pleaded
guilty since the loss of defendant’s pension was a collateral, not direct, consequence of
plea); United States v. Reeves, 695 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding counsel not
required to advise client that guilty plea might be used to enhance defendant’s sentence in
future case).
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requisite immigration advice and convey all plea offers, how should courts
evaluate the nature and quality of those acts?

V. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND COUNSELING BEYOND PLEAS
Growing naturally out of these inquiries are the next wave of counseling
issues: assessing what amounts to ethical and constitutional counseling in
the wide range of decisions that are made during the course of a criminal
case.108 As of today, the court has focused on counseling about pleas, but
the curtain has been pulled back and counseling generally is now under the
judicial microscope.
Defense attorneys must consider the nature and quality of the advice they
give on all decisions made in the course of their representation. What
amounts to effective assistance in the context of advising about the full
range of so-called fundamental decisions reserved for the accused—whether
to plead, whether to testify, whether to waive a jury, and whether to
appeal?109 Similarly, what are the constitutional contours of advising vis-avis strategic or tactical decisions ceded to the lawyer?110 Ultimately, as
108
See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 619 F.3d 1252, 1262 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding
counsel’s failure to understand basic mechanics of sentencing guidelines and to advise
client about consequences at sentencing of his admissions during presentence interview
amounted to constitutionally deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington).
109
See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (recognizing that “the accused has
the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to
whether to plead, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal” but
holding that appellate counsel need not press every nonfrivolous claim urged by
defendant) (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DEFENSE FUNCTION §§ 45.2, 21-2.2 (2d ed. 1980)).
110
See, e.g., Jones, 463 U.S. at 753 n.6 (“The ABA Defense Function Standards
provide . . . that, with the exceptions specified above [i.e., regarding fundamental
decisions], strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of defense counsel,
after consultation with the client.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (“In a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will
testify.”); People v. Colville, 979 N.E.2d 1125, 29 (N.Y. 2012) (“This appeal calls upon
us to consider how decision making authority is allocated within the attorney-client
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courts weigh in on the components of constitutionally effective counseling,
they will also have to decide what happens when client and lawyer
disagree—what is the appropriate and constitutional allocation of decisionmaking authority between clients and lawyers in criminal cases?111
Heightened attention to counseling in all facets of criminal defense
representation should yield tangible benefits in addition to the demise of
“meet, greet and plead” lawyering. It seems inevitable that there will be
more litigated hearings and trials if defense attorneys comply with the
dictates of Padilla, Lafler, and Frye. Although the Court recognized in
Padilla that it will nevertheless often be in the clients’ best interest to plead
guilty even if they are advised that they are facing deportation,112 surely
relationship with respect to submission of less-included offenses to the jury. Is this
decision fundamental—comparable to how to plead and whether to waive a jury, take the
stand or appeal—and therefore reserved to the accused, or is it a matter of strategy and
tactics, ultimately for the defense attorney to decide?”).
111
See, e.g., Rodney J. Uphoff, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense
Counsel and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client
Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1998) (“Given the mixed guidance provided
by legal commentators, case law, and professional standards regarding the proper
division of decisionmaking responsibility, lawyers are relatively free to decide for
themselves whether they will share decisionmaking power with clients. The question then
becomes . . . . [A]re lawyers willing to respect the strategic choices of a client even
though they disagree with the client’s choice?”); Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control
the Decision To Call A Witness: Respecting a Criminal Defendant’s Tactical Choices, 68
U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 796 (2000) (“ABA Standard 4-5.2, entitled ‘Control and Direction of
the Case,’ substantially tracks the division of decisionmaking responsibility between
counsel and a criminal defendant set forth in Model Rule 1.2(a) and the majority opinion
in Jones v. Barnes.”); People v. Colville, 909 N.Y.S.2d 463, 473 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)
(characterizing majority’s opinion in Jones v. Barnes as “adhering to traditional lawyercentered approach” and Justice Blackmun’s concurrence in Barnes as “espousing clientcentered approach”), rev’d, People v. Colville, 979 N.E.2d 1125 (N.Y. 2012).
112
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (“By bringing deportation
consequences into this [plea-bargaining] process, the defense and prosecution may well
be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of both
parties . . . . Counsel . . . may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in
order to a craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by
avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal
consequences.”).
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there will be many situations where the opposite is true. There will be cases
where, if fully informed and advised about all the potential adverse
consequences of a plea, the accused will opt for a trial, or at least a pretrial
hearing, rather than plead guilty.113 Just maybe then this trilogy of cases will
nudge the criminal court toward the adversarial system it theoretically is
supposed to be, and Gideon’s original plea for lawyers to represent the
indigent at trial will move a little closer to realization. The transformative
potential is there if lawyers for the poor are willing to look in the mirror and
find it.

113

See, e.g., id. at 1483 (“[P]reserving the client’s right to remain in the United States
may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.”); People v. Picca,
947 N.Y.S.2d 120, 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (concluding that, had defendant been fully
informed of the deportation consequences of a plea, “a decision to reject the plea offer,
and take a chance, however slim, of being acquitted after trial, would have been
rational”); United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 643 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Padilla reiterated
that an alien defendant might rationally be more concerned with removal than with a term
of imprisonment.”).
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